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Film Censorship
Since Roth-Alberts*
By

GEORGE

I.

D.

HAIMBAUGH, JR.**

BACKGROUND

In 1952, in the case of Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson' the
United States Supreme Court announced its departure from the
position which it had taken thirty-seven years earlier m Mutual
Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n of Ohzo 2 and held that "expression by means of motion pictures is included within the free
speech and free press guaranty of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments." S The change was presaged by a reinterpretation
of the scope of the fourteenth amendment and by the development of the cinema as a medium of serious expression.
Since the district court in Mutual4 had quoted the Supreme
Court to the effect that "the first eight articles of the amendments
to the Constitution have reference to powers exercised by the
government of the United States and not to those of the states,"5
the Supreme Court had in a series of decisions from Gitlow v.
New York 6 through Schnezder v. State first assumed and then
held that "freedom of speech and of the press-which are protected by the First Amendment from abridgment by Congressare among the fundamental personal rights and 'liberties' protec* This article recapitulates some material from George D. Haunbaugh, Jr.,
The Possibility of Diversity of Exression Through Motion Pictures: The Experience of the United States and the Countries of the European Economic Community, II -C -1 -f -2 a & d) (unpublished J.S.D. thesis, Yale, 1962).
" Assistant Professor of Law, Akron University College of Law.

1343 U.S. 495 (1952).

2236 U.S. 230 (1915).
3 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952).
4 Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Commn of Otno, 215 Fed. 138, 141 (ND.
Ohio 1914).
5Eilenbecker v. Plymouth County, 134 U.S. 31, 84 (1890).
6Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
7
Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939). For citations to other cases m
series, see 348 U.S. at 500, n. 8.
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ted by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from
impairment by the States.""
"It cannot be put out of view," the Supreme Court stated in
Mutual, "that the exhibition of moving pictures is a business,
pure and simple, originated and conducted for profit, like other
spectacles, not to be regarded, nor intended to be regarded
as part of the press of the country, or as organs of public opinion." This characterization of motion pictures was delivered
by Mr. Justice McKenna a few days before the presentation by
David Wark Griffith of The Birth of a Nation-the film of which
President Wilson said, "
like writing history in lightning."10
With the release of such films as Battleship Potempkin, Triumph
of the Will, The Grand Illusion, The March of Times series and
The Plough that Broke the Plains it became clear that McKenna
had been overruled by Einstein, Reifenstahl, Renoir, Luce and
Lorenz.
By 1948, the year that Luchino Vihconti shook Italy with La
Terra Trema, Mr. Justice Douglas took note of the changed
status of the movies and inserted in his opinion in an antitrust
case, United States v. Paramount Pictures, the dictum that,
"we have no doubt that moving pictures, like newspapers and
radio, are included in the press whose freedom is guaranteed
by the First Amendment.""1 Mr. Justice Clark made it, official
in Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson in which he held:
It cannot be doubted that motion pictures are a significant medium for the communication of ideas. They may
affect public atitudes and behavior in a variety of ways,
ranging from direct espousal of a political or social doctrine to the subtle shaping of thought which characterizes
all artistic expression. The importance of motion pictures
as an organ of public opinion is not lessened by the fact that
they are designed to entertain as well as to inform.12
The Court warned in Burstyn that it did- not necessarily
follow that "the Constitution requires absolute freedom to exhibit every motion picture of every kind at all times ancf -i11
8 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).

9236 U.S. 280, 244 (1915).
10 Mught, The Lavliest Art 35 (1957).
11 834 U.S. 131, 166 (1948).
12343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952).
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places," 13 or that "motion pictures are necessarily subject to the
precise rules governing any other patricular method of expression. '14 The Court then proceeded to reverse the banning by
the New York censor of a film as "sacrilegious" on the grounds
that that standard was too broad and that the state had "no
legitimate interest in protecting any or all religions from views
distasteful to them which is sufficient to justify prior restraints
upon the expression of those views." 15 "Since the term 'sacnlegious' isthe sole standard under attack here," Mr. Justice
Clark added for the Court, "it is not necessary for us to decide,
for example, whether a state may censor motion pictures under
a clearly drawn statute designed and applied to prevent the
showing of obscene films."1 6
As the next four film censorship cases to reach the Supreme
Court were decided per curiam and without opinion of the
Court,1 7 an answer to the issue which Mr. Justice Clark had
posed concerning obscene films did not begin to emerge until
the Roth-Alberts decision of 1956.
II.

ROTH-ALBERTS,

1957

AND AxTER

A. Roth-Alberts, 1957
In Roth v. Unted States's and Alberts v. California,9 the

Supreme Court upheld the validity of both the federal and the
state obscenity statutes respectively involved in the two cases.
Mr. Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, held that obscenity
is not constitutionally protected and that such "statutes, applied
according to the proper standard for judging obscenity, do not
offend constitutional safeguards against convictions based upon

protected material, or fail to give men in acting adequate notice
of what is prohibited." 20
Benig "squarely presented" for the first time with the question of "whether obscenity is utterance within the area of pro-

tected speech," 21 the Supreme Court relied upon holdings of
13 Id. at
14 Id. at
15 Id. at
16 Id.at

502.
503.
505.
505-06.

17 See notes 30-33 tnfra.
18354 U.S. 476 (1957).

19 Ibid.
201d.at 492.
21

Id, at 481.
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lower courts and earlier dicta of its own. The Court adopted
the assumption, 22 which finds its best known formulation in
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshtre,23 that obscenity is among those
"well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to
raise any Constitutional problem." 24 Citing lower court decisions, the Supreme Court held that "obscene, lewd, lascivious,
or filthy
or
indecent" are words which "give adequate
warning of the conduct prescribed." 25 Drawing an analogy
from Beauharnatsv. Illinots,2n the Court held that the state may
act against obscene materials-as against libelous utteranceswithout proving that they "will preceptibly create a clear and
present danger of antisocial conduct.

'2 7

Returning to Mutual

28

Film Corp., the first motion picture censorship case to have
come before it, the Court chose the concept of appeal to the
prurient interest as the key to distinguishing between obscene
and other material dealing with sex. And borrowing from the
Judges Hand29 and from the sixth draft of the American Law
Institute's Model Penal Code,3 0 the Court proceeded to formulate a more complex test for judging obscenity. That test
is: "Whether to the average person, applying contemporary
community standards, the dominant theme of the material
taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest."3 1
Thus, obscenity as determined by the prurient interest test
was held to be an ascertainable standard suitable at least for
statutes providing for subsequent punishment.
B. The per curzams, 1952-1957
During the decade of the fifties, seven motion pictures
which were censored by state or city governments were later
22 Ibid.

23815 U.S. 568 (1942).

24 Id. at 571-72.

25354 U.S. 476, 491 (1957).
26343 U.S. 250 (1952).
27

354 U.S. 476, 486 (1957).

28236
U.S. 230 (1915).
2

DAugustus: United States v. One Book Called "Ulysses," 5 F Supp. 182
(S.D. N.Y. 1933), affd, 72 F 2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934); Learned: United States
v. Kennerley, 209 Fed. 119, 120-21 (S.D.N.Y. 1913). See Lockhart and McClure,
Literature, the Law of Obscenity and the Constitution, 38 Minn. L. Rev. 295,
324-52 (1954), or Lockhart and MClure, Obscenity in the Courts, 20 Law &
Contemp. Prob. 587 (1955).

30354 U.S. 476, 499 (1957).

31 Id. at 489.

KEN
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passed by the United States Supreme Court m decisions rendered per curiam and without opinion of the Court. Of these
seven, four-M (in Superior) ,32 La Ronde (in Commercial),3
The Moon Is Blue (in Holmby) 3 and The Game of Love
(in Times) 3 5--were censored on the ground of "immorality."
In its decisions in these cases, the Court merely cited Burstyn
in the cases of M and La Ronde, Burstyn and Superior m the
case of The Moon is Blue, and Roth-Alberts in the case of The
Game of Love. Aid in interpreting these cryptic decisions
may be gained from the recognition and discussion m RothAlberts of "obscenity" as a valid and definite statutory standard.3 6 "Immorality," it should be noted, was not listed among
statutory terms held to be generally synonomous with obscenity
and to give adequate notice of what is prohibited. From this it
can be concluded that the Court may have decided as it did
in the case of these four films because it deemed "immorality"
to be too broad a standard.3 7 The Court, it appears, was agreeing
with the view expressed by the dissenting judges m the Court of
Appeals of New York in Commercial (La Ronde). There Judge
Fuld stated that, "immoral" is a term "of such vague and undefined limits
[as to] fail to furnish objective criterion necessary to insure that there shall be no interference with the exercise
of rights secured by the First Amendment. By attempting to cover
so much, the catch-all provision
'immoral' effectively covers
nothing. '3 8 Judge Dye added that, "the term 'immoral' when not
connected to 'obscene'-and here it is nothas a variety of
meanings varying according to time, geography and to some extent, subjective judgment." 39
Chicago s ban on the exhibition of The Game of Love,40 however, had been on the ground that the film was immoral and
obscene. The stark reference to Alberts in the Court's decision4 i
3
2 Supenor
33

Films v. Department of Educ., 346 U.S. 587 (1954).
Commercial Pictures Corp. v. Regents of University, 346 U.S. 587 (1954).
34 Holmby Prods. v. Vaughn, 350 U.S. 870 (1955).
35
Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 355 U.S. 35 (1957).

36
354 U.S. 476, 491 (1957).
37
Graham, Recent Developments, 20 Olo St. LJ. 161, 162 (1959).
3
8Commercial Pictures Corp. v. Board of Regents, 305 N.Y. 336, ....... 113
N.E. 2d 502, 519 (1953).
39 Id. at ....... 113 N.E. 2d at 516.
40 A French film version of the Collette novel, Le B16 en herbe.
41 Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 355 U.S. 35 (1957).
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would indicate that it had applied the prurient interest test to
The Game of Love and found the film to be not obscene. If this
assumption is correct, The Game of Love is the only film thus far
to be subjected to the prurient interest test by the Supreme Court
and, to paraphrase Mr. Justice Frankfurter, 42 not to scrutinize the
contents of that film in this article would be to play Hamlet
without Hamlet.
Of The Game of Love, Judge Schnackenberg wrote the following in describing the reaction to that film of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit:
The film, as an exhibit in tihs case, was projected before and viewed by us. We found that, from beginning
to end, the thread of the story is supercharged with a current of lewdness generated by a series of illicit sexual
intimacies and acts. In the introductory scenes, a flying
start is made when a 16 year old boy is shown completely
nude on a bathing beach in the presence of a group of
younger girls. On that plane, the narrative proceeds to
reveal the seduction of this boy by a physically attractive
woman old enough to be his mother. Under the influence
of this experience and an arrangement to repeat it, the boy
thereupon engaged in sexual relations with a girl of his
own age. The erotic thread of the story is earned, without
deviation toward any wholesome idea, through scene after
scene. The narrative is graphically pictured with nothing
omitted except those sexual consummations which are
plainly suggested but meaningfully omitted and thus, by
the very fact of omission, emphasized. The words spoken
in French are reproduced in printed English on the lower
edge of the moving film. None of it palliates the effect
of the scenes
portrayed.
All
found it obscene and
43
unmoral.

The Supreme Court's reversal of the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals in Times 1_4- (The Game of Love) was followed during
the same term by reversals 45-also per curiam and solely on the
basis of citations to Roth-Alberts-of two other Court of Appeals
42

Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 527 (1948).

43 Times

Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 244 F 2d 432, 436 (7th Cir. 1957).

44355
U.S. 35 (1957).
45
Sunshme Book Co. v. Summerfield, 355 U.S. 372 (1958), reverstng 249
F 2d 114 (D.C. Cir. 1957), and One, Inc. v. Olesen, 355 U.S. 371 (1958),
reversing 241 F. 2d 772 (9th Cir. 1957).
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judgments that certain magazines were obscene. The periodicals
so adjudged by the lower courts were a nudist magazine and another held to be "morally depraving and debasing, and
designed for persons having lecherous and salacious proclivities." 46
These reversals point to the conclusion that the prurient interest
test as applied by the Supreme Court is the equivalent of a "hardcore" pornography test.
Among proponents of this interpretation of the Court's per
curiam opinions in obscenity cases is Thurman Arnold who has
praised the Court for its use of the per curiam to avoid the trap
of defining what "hard-core" pornography is. He explains:
No one can reason why anything is or is not obscene
What the Supreme Court is saying to the lower court
judges is that
if the material is bad enough they can
leave the case to a jury If it isn't the indictment should
be dismissed or a verdict directed. This decision may be
made at a glance. Studying the material for hours doesn't
tell a judge any more about its obscene character than he
47
knew when he first looked at it.

In six years (1952-1957) the Supreme Court had handed down
six per curiam decisions in which it reversed lower court determinations that four films and two magazines were obscene and/or
immoral. From a consideration of these per curiams in the light
of Roth-Alberts, it becomes apparent that (1) the word "immorality" is too imprecise to serve as a statutory standard, and (2) that
with the application of the prurient interest test the concept of
obscenity is limited to a narrow, "hard-core" connotation.
C. Kingsley Pictures, 1959
Adultery and illicit sex, sometimes necessary plot matenal, shall not
be justified or made to seem right and
permissible.-III-I, Motion Picture Production Code.48
A license shall not be granted to "a motion picture film
which expressly or impliedly presents acts of sexual
immorality as desirable, acceptable or proper patterns of
behavior." 49
46
47

0ne, Inc. v. Olesen, supra note 45, at 778.

Bnef for Respondent-Appellant, pp. 21-22, Vermont v. Verham News
Corp. (Windsor County Court, Docket No. 2779, Supreme Court, Docket No.
1805, 1959), as quoted m Kalven, The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity,
1 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 44 (1960). See note 11 W Res. L. Rev. 669 (1960).
81962 The Film Daily Year Book of Motion Pictures 950,
49 N.Y. Consol. Laws §122a,
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Lady Chatterley's Lover, a film version of the novel by D.
H. Lawrence, was refused a license by the motion picture division of the New York Education Department which found it
"immoral" under New York law Refusing to delete the objectionable scenes, the distributor obtained a review of the ruling by the Regents of the University of the State of New York
who upheld the division on the broader ground that "the whole
theme of this picture is immoral under said law, for that theme
is the presentation of adultery as a desirable, acceptable and
proper pattern of behavior." Unanimously annulling the action of the Regents, the appellate division explained that as
they interpreted the decisions of the Supreme Court in the
Burstyn, Commercial, Superior and Holmby cases, "a statute
which leaves any field open to the opinion, discretion or individual point of view of a censor in banning a moving picture
violates the Fourteenth Amendment. If any field of prior
restraint is left open it would seem clear that the Supreme
Court decisions forbid a statute as broad as the one under
consideration."5 0 Citing Roth-Alberts, the court of appeals agreed
unanimously that the film was not obscene but divided sharply
in its decision to reverse the judgment of the appellate division
because the picture taken as a whole "alluringly portrays adultery
as proper behavior." 51
The Supreme Court thus was presented with a problem that is
routine to the Motion Picture Production Code Office. Joseph
I. Breen, long-time director of that office, might have said that
the issue was whether the love triangle involving Lord and Lady
Chatterley and the gamekeeper Mellors should be allowed to be
presented without the inclusion of "adequate compensating moral
values. '5 2 To Professor Kalven, Lawrence's story of "sexually
unconventional conduct [which] does not meet punishment"
presents the question of "thematic obscenity," and the Court was
being asked to decide whether there can be "obscene ideas as well
as obscene images."53 Mr. Justice Stewart, -riting for the Court,
asked whether the state of New York could "prevent the exhi50 Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 165 N.Y.S. 2d 681, 683 (1957).

51 Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 4 N.Y. 2d 349, 175 N.L.S. 2d 39,
151 N.E.
2d 197 (1958).
52
Inglis, Freedom of the Movies 157-58 (1947).
5
NKalven, op. cit. supra note 44, at 28.
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bition of a motion picture because that picture advocates an idea
-that adultery under certain circumstances may be proper behavior," 54 and answered in this manner:
[T]he First Amendment's basic guarantee is of freedom to
advocate ideas. The State, quite simply, has thus struck
at the very heart of constitutionally protected liberty.
It is contended that the State s action was justified because the motion picture attractively portrays a relationship which is contrary to the moral standards, the religious precepts, and the legal code of its citizenry. This
argument misconceives what it is that the Constitution
protects. Its guarantee is not confined to the expression
of ideas that are conventional or shared by a majority
It protects advocacy of the opimon that adultery may sometimes be proper, no less than advocacy of socialism or the
single tax. And in the realm of ideas it protects expression which is eloquent no less than that which is unconvmcmg. 55
D. Times II (Don Juan), 1961
Since 1952, the Supreme Court had decided eight motion picture censorship cases without the vote of a single justice being
cast in favor of censorship. In concurring opinions citing Near
v. Minnesota,56 Justices Black and Douglas had reiterated their
position "that prior censorship of moving pictures like prior
censorship of newspapers and books violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments."5 7 By refusing to submit its movie Don Juan,
to the Chicago censors and asking the district court to order the
city officials to issue an exhibition permit for the film, the Times
Film Corporation eventually presented the rest of the Supreme
Court with the opportunity of taking a stand either with Black
and Douglas on the general rule of Near or on the exception to
that rule which states that "the protection even as to previous
restraint is not absolutely unlimited."5 8
54

Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684, 688 (1959).
55 Id. at 688-89.
56283 U.S. 697 (1931).
57Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684, 690 (1959).
This position has been stated earlier by Mr. Justice Douglas m Celling v. Texas,
843 U.S. 960 (1952), and (with Mr. Justice Black) m Superior Films v. Dept
of Educ. (Commercial Pictures v. Regents), 846 U.S. 587 (1953).
58 Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931); see Emerson, The Doctrine
of PFror Restrant, 20 Law & Contemp. Prob. 648 (1955); Note, Entertainment:
Publio Pressures and the Law, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 326, 326-40 (1957).
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The Court, in a five to four decision, restated from Kingsley
Books, Inc. v. Brown, that "the phrase prior restraint' is not a
self-wielding sword. Nor can it serve as a talismanic test." 9 "We
recognize m Burstyn
.," the opinion continued, "that capacity
for evil
may be relevant in determining the permissible scope
of community control.
It is not for this Court to limit the
State in its selection of the remedy it deems most effective to
cope with such a problem, absent, of course, a showing of unreasonable strictures on individual liberty resulting from its application in particular circumstances."'00 At this time Mr. Justice
Clark concluded for the Court, "we say no more than thisthat we are dealing only with motion pictures and, even as to
them, only in the context of the broadside attack presented on
this record."(i
The question of the administrative censorship of obscene
movies remained unanswered. However, Mr. Justice Clark hinted
that "hardcore" pornography might be among exceptions to the
doctrine against prior restraint when he noted: "Petitioner claims
that the nature of the film is irrelevant, and that even if this film
contains the basest type of pornography, or incitement to riot,
or forceful overthrow of orderly government, it may nonetheless be shown without prior submission for examination." But
he added, "the challenge here is to the censor's basic authority;
it does not go to any statutory standards employed by the censor
or procedural requirements as to the submission of the film." 62
III. CONCLUSION

To what extent has the Supreme Court answered its own
question in Burstyn as to "whether a state may censor motion pictures under a clearly drawn statute designed and applied to prevent the showing of obscene films?"
Roth-Alberts provided the prurient interest test through which
obscenity becomes a standard precise enough at least for statutes
providing for subsequent punishment. In the light of Roth-Alberts, earlier per curiams (M, La Ronde, The Moon Is Blue)
indicate that the term "immorality" is too vague to be a statutory
590 354 U.S. 436, 441 (1957).
6 Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 49-50 (1961).
61 Id. at 50.
62 Id. at 47.
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standard, and Times I (The Game of Love) helps to establish
that the prurient interest test virtually restricts the legal meaning of obscenity to "hard-core" pornography. Kingsley Pictures
(Lady Chatterley's Lover) held that a state cannot require that
a movie depicting immorality must show that such conduct does
not pay. Times II (Don Juan) held that a statute providing for
prior restraint is not invalid per se, and may have hinted that
obscenity could be an exception to the general rule against prior
restraints.
But, in view of the fact that the Supreme Court has not upheld the censorship of a particular film since it recognized the
movies as part of the press and remembering that two of the five
justices who made up the majority in Times II are now retired,
can a censor assume that the Court has told him anything more
than, "hang your clothes on a hickory limb, but don't go near
the water?"

